













INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES 
 
BANK OF JAPAN 
 
2-1-1 NIHONBASHI-HONGOKUCHO 
CHUO-KU, TOKYO 103-8660 
 JAPAN 
 
You can download this and other papers at the IMES Web site: 
http://www.imes.boj.or.jp 
 
Do not reprint or reproduce without permission. 
The Future of Central Banking: 
A Lesson from United States History 
 
 
Bennett T. McCallum 
 
 

























NOTE:  IMES Discussion Paper Series is circulated in 
order  to  stimulate  discussion  and  comments.  Views 
expressed in Discussion Paper Series are those of 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the Bank of Japan or the Institute for Monetary 








The Future of Central Banking: 
A Lesson from United States History 
 
 





















This paper is being prepared for the 2010 international conference of the Institute for Monetary and 
Economic Studies of the Bank of Japan, “The Future of Central Banking under Globalization,” to be 
held May 26-27, 2010, in Tokyo. I am grateful to Marvin Goodfriend for helpful discussions.   1
1. Introduction 
  In this presentation I will begin by reviewing an important and interesting episode 
in United States monetary history together with some resulting decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  This may seem like a strange topic for a conference on the future of 
central banking, but I believe that it is in fact highly relevant.  In developing that position 
I will be referring to a paper given at the Bank of Japan conference in 2009 by my 
colleague, Marvin Goodfriend, a paper that promotes an analytical framework for 
thinking about monetary policy.
1  Following this development, I will conclude by briefly 
outlining some ways of conducting monetary policy that are inspired by metallic 
standards of the past—thereby illustrating a second type of connection between today’s 
policy issues and the monetary arrangements of long-past historical experiences. 
   Let us begin by reviewing what the Constitution of the United States has to say 
about monetary arrangements.  It is an easy matter to do so because monetary affairs are 
mentioned only twice in the Constitution, with the two brief provisions being as follows: 
  (i)  “The Congress shall have power ... to borrow money on the credit of the 
  United   States, ..., to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, 
  and fix the standard of weights and measures” [Article I, Section 8].   
  (ii) “No state shall ... coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold 
  and silver coin a tender in payment of debts ... [Article I, Section 10]. 
From these provisions it seems abundantly clear that the vision and presumption 
embodied in the Constitution was that the nation’s monetary arrangements would feature 
a strict metallic standard—one with either gold or silver as the standard commodity or, 
                                                 
1 A revised version of that paper will be published shortly in the Journal of Monetary Economics.  See 
Goodfriend (2010).   2
alternatively, one involving a gold-silver bimetallic system.
2  As there is no mention of 
the monetary standard among the amendments to the Constitution, a fundamental 
question arises naturally, namely: how were these provisions of the Constitution 
overturned so as to result in today’s fiat-money arrangement in which Federal Reserve 
notes serve as legal tender and there is no trace whatsoever of a metallic standard? 
2. The Greenbacks 
  The occasion upon which fiat money made its appearance in the U.S., for the first 
time since the adoption of the Constitution, was the Civil War of 1861-1865, with three 
issues of the infamous “Greenbacks” occurring in 1862, 1863, and 1864.  The total 
Greenback emission was $450 million, which alone would have represented a near-
doubling of the money supply relative to its magnitude in 1860.
3  The context for the first 
of these issues was that in late 1861 matters were not going well for the U.S. government. 
Militarily the rebellious Southern forces were holding their own (First Battle of Bull Run), 
and financially the U.S. was finding it difficult to provide its armies with troops and 
supplies.  Both orthodox and unorthodox schemes had been attempted, and still the North 
was finding it extremely difficult to raise funds needed for prosecution of the war.
4  
Additional taxation of U.S. citizens would be unpopular and borrowing was viewed as 
likely to require “prohibitively high” rates of interest.  Consequently, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, Salmon P. Chase—of whom we shall hear much more—and an enthusiastic 
committee chairman, Rep. Elbridge G. Spaulding, devised a plan for finance by issuing 
                                                 
2 This opinion has been expressed by Hepburn (1924, pp. 73-74, 179), Timberlake (1989) (1993, p. 4), and 
McCallum (1989, p. 24). 
3 Timberlake (1993, p. 86) states that “The stock of money in circulation in 1860 was on the order of $500 
million, composed of roughly equal amounts of currency and bank deposits.”  Hepburn (1924, p.204) gives 
an estimate of $448. 
4 For a detailed description, see Mitchell (1903, pp. 1-43).   3
fiat paper money, which came to be called “Greenbacks.”  These would be legal tender 
notes, non-redeemable, and non-interest-bearing.  Spaulding wrote the legislative bill 
after which he and Chase led its passage, which met with much opposition in the House 
of Representatives.
5  Spaulding argued that haste was necessary; that the government 
would “be out of means to pay the daily expenses in about thirty days, and the committee 
do not see any other way to get along till we can get the tax bills ready....”.
6       
  At the time, the constitutionality of the Greenback issues was questioned by 
numerous observers (including many members of the U.S. Senate) as their characteristics 
were highly similar to those of the “bills of credit” specifically prohibited by the 
Constitution.
7  Unfortunately, at least for the sake of clarity, this prohibition applies to the 
states but not—at least not explicitly—to the Congress.
8  The resulting degree of 
ambiguity enabled the Greenback proponents to argue that their issuance was justified by 
the Constitution’s granting to the Congress of the power “... to make all laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other 
powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States ...” [Article I, 
Section 8].  Strong counter-arguments were made in 1862 that the Greenback issues 
                                                 
5 It should be said that Chase was following this course of action with considerable reluctance.  Indeed, 
Mitchell (1903, p. 4), describes him as “a secretary of the treasury who cherished a strong predilection for 
metallic money.”  
6 This claim turned out to be “a gross exaggeration.  The Legal Tender Act did not pass until 48 days after 
Spaulding’s ominous forecast, and no notes were issued for 34 days after the bill was signed into law” 
(Timberlake, 1989, p. 310).  
7 The Greenbacks were non-redeemable, non-interest-bearing, indefinitely-lived, full legal tender (for 
private and public debts) liabilities of the Treasury, known as U.S. Notes.  The term “bills of credit” was 
used to refer to fiat paper money issues of various types issued by the thirteen colonies prior to the 
Declaration of Independence.  For one analysis of the controversial results of some of these episodes, see 
McCallum (1992).   
8 The Constitution also declares, in Amendment X, that “The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”  
This provision evidently gives the states precedence in some sense, making it strange that some power 
expressly denied to the states could be permissible by the Congress, but it does not pertain to the matter in 
question because the latter is prohibited to the states.   4
would be only “helpful” to the government’s conduct of the war, not “necessary,” and the 
bill barely squeezed through Congress.
9  But it was signed by President Lincoln on 
February 25, 1862, and the first issue took place in April 1862.  At the time, Secretary 
Chase expressed considerable misgivings about making the notes legal tender—see 
Mitchell (1903, pp. 68-74). 
  3. Legal Tender Cases in the Supreme Court 
  If the Greenback issue had been only temporary, the nation might have returned 
after the war to a metallic standard, as in many other cases during European history.  That 
was not to happen in this instance, however.  Calomiris (1992, p. 283) notes that “… the 
permanence of the federal encroachment into the supply of currency and the regulation of 
the numeraire depended on congressional inaction (failing to repeal the laws quickly and 
return to a specie standard) and Supreme Court approval once the laws were tested.” 
  It was natural that no challenges to the constitutionality of the Greenback issues 
would arise until after the conclusion of the Civil War.  The first case to make it to the 
Supreme Court was Hepburn v. Griswold, in 1869.  Griswold, who had made a loan (in 
dollars) to Hepburn before the issuance of the Greenbacks, went to court when Hepburn 
attempted to make repayment in Greenbacks   By this time, strangely enough, Chase—
who had been Secretary of the Treasury in 1862—was Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court.  Furthermore, he was part of the 4-3 majority who ruled in favor of Griswold by 
declaring that in part the Legal Tender Act of 1862—for which he was largely 
responsible—was unconstitutional!            
                                                 
9 In fact, at the subcommittee level, the bill fell one vote short of enough to be sent on to the House.  One 
member then changed his vote so that the full House could consider it.  There it passed (in January, 1862) 
by a vote of 93 to 59.  Several of those congressmen voting in favor expressed the view that it was to be 
only a temporary expedient; Chairman Spaulding himself stated that “when peace is secured, I will be 
among the first to advocate a speedy return to specie payments;” see Mitchell (1903, p. 67).     5
  That was not the end of the story, however.  On the very day on which the 
Hepburn v. Griswold ruling was made public, President Ulysses S. Grant announced the 
appointment of two new justices to the Supreme Court, both of whom had as judges made 
rulings that indicated that they held positions clearly supportive of the validity of the 
legal tender laws.  Consequently, when another legal-tender case made it to the Supreme 
Court in 1871, the Hepburn v. Griswold ruling was overturned and the legal-tender laws 
were ruled to be consistent with the Constitution.  (Interestingly, Chase found himself 
voting in the minority this time, as he again judged the laws, that he had requested as 
Secretary of the Treasury in 1862, to be unconstitutional.)  This later ruling, in a case 
known as Knox v. Lee (1871), was upheld in subsequent cases, including Juilliard v. 
Greenman in 1884. 
  I am drifting a bit away from our main subject, but find it irresistible briefly to 
consider whether President Grant’s appointment of two Greenback-favorable members to 
the Supreme Court should be considered as a successful “packing” of the court, and 
thereby as a predecessor of President Roosevent’s infamous attempt to pack the court in 
1937.  Very briefly, it turns out that Grant’s actions were considerably less objectionable, 
even though the nominees’ views on the matter were known, for two reasons.  First, 
Grant had made the appointments before the outcome of Hepburn v. Griswold was 
announced.  Second, and much more fundamentally, Grant’s action in increasing the size 
of the court evidently was not as blatantly improper.  The Court had been temporarily 
below its previous number of justices, as the consequence of a congressional act of July 
1866 brought about (supposedly) by congressional desire to avoid Court appointments by 
President Andrew Johnson, who had been impeached in 1868 but acquitted.  The act   6
enlarging the Court to nine justices was passed in 1869, possibly with an eye to 
overturning the ruling in Hepburn v. Griswold (although that ruling had not yet been 
given).  For more detail see Hepburn (1935, pp. 255-6), Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 
p.47), Dunne (1960, pp. 76-77), and Ratner (1935). 
 4. Supreme Court Decisions and Future Monetary Policy 
  But what, one might well ask, does all of this have to do with current and future 
monetary policy arrangements?  My answer is that the Supreme Court arguments in favor 
of Greenback constitutionality relied to a substantial extent on a crucial confusion 
between monetary and fiscal policy.  In particular, note that “the power to borrow 
money” is a fiscal, not a monetary, provision.  Specifically, it gives Congress the right to 
borrow—to sell government debt to the public—an activity that does not necessarily 
entail any change in the outstanding stock of money. “Borrowing” and “lending” are 
terms that pertain to fiscal actions, not monetary actions; for when the Treasury sells or 
purchases bonds rather than raising or lowering taxes (in order to finance increased or 
decreased government expenditures) there is no necessary or implied change in the 
nation’s quantity (stock) of high-powered money—and no change in the private sector’s 
holdings when the borrowed funds are immediately spent on (e.g., military) supplies and 
wages, as was the case in 1862.      
  But the reasoning expounded by Supreme Court justices in two crucial cases did 
not recognize this distinction.  Instead, they argued as if the quoted power (“to borrow 
money”) would justify the issue of legal-tender fiat money. These cases were Knox v. 
Lee (in 1870) and Julliard v. Greenman (in 1884).
10  In addition, the arguments made by  
                                                 
10 Confusion, in Supreme Court reasoning, of borrowing with monetary powers is pointed out in   7
congressmen in 1861 in favor of the Greenback issue,
11 and by minority members of the 
Supreme Court in the Hepburn v. Griswold case (Hepburn, p. 257), also involved this 
confusion.  In sum, it is my argument that the failure to distinguish clearly between 
monetary and fiscal policy actions was a major contributing factor to the Supreme Court 
decisions that made possible the alteration of the U.S. monetary standard from a metallic-
money to a fiat-money system, a change of truly fundamental and momentous proportion.   
Of course this change was not completed until much later, as convertibility of paper 
money into gold was maintained from 1879 until 1933 and some remaining elements of a 
metallic system until 1971, as is well known.  But the legal tender cases were necessary 
preludes to the later steps in the process of de-metallization; without them, subsequent 
actions and judicial rulings could have been very different from those that actually 
transpired. 
  Thus the failure of legislators and justices to recognize the basic distinction 
between monetary and fiscal policy played a central role in the fundamental and 
momentous historical change, from metallic to fiat regimes, in U.S. monetary 
arrangements.   But essentially the same failure has been present in much of the recent 
discussion concerning the financial crisis of 2007-2009, as is revealed in the analysis of 
Goodfriend (2010), whose argument focuses on this distinction and emphasizes its 
fundamental importance for central-bank independence.
 12 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussions by Hepburn (1935, p. 264), Dunne (1960, pp. 78-79, 82), and Timberlake (1989, pp.  312) 
(1993, p. 137-138).   
11 These arguments are extensively documented by Mitchell (1903, pp. 44-81). 
12 The framework proposed by Goodfriend (2010) emphasizes the distinction by means of the following 
definitions: (i) pure monetary policy consists of central bank open market purchases (or sales) of Treasury 
securities; (ii) pure credit policy consists of changes in assets held by the central bank the with monetary 
base held constant; and (iii) interest-on-reserves policy consists of changes in the interest paid on 
commercial bank reserves held with the central bank.   A purchase by the central bank of non-Treasury 
securities is then a mixture of monetary and credit policy, a mixture that has direct fiscal ramifications.     8
5. Contemporary Relevance 
  The foregoing discussion has suggested that monetary arrangements in the U.S. 
have departed sharply from those specified by the Constitution, and that the change has 
been based in crucial ways on invalid reasoning.  Does this mean that I would favor a 
return to the metallic standard implied by the Constitution?  In fact, I would not propose 
or favor an attempt to return to a gold or silver or bimetallic standard, and only partly 
because doing so would now require a constitutional amendment that I—and probably 
most readers—would judge to be nearly impossible politically to achieve.  More 
important, in my opinion, is that we could now do better by recreating the essence of the 
Constitution’s instructions within the context of today’s paper money arrangements and 
with an improved monetary policy target.  In particular, the provisions of the Constitution 
were clearly designed to prevent major ongoing changes in the purchasing power of the 
medium of exchange.  Given the absence of publically available data on comprehensive 
price indices in those days—or even any form of rapid communication among 
hypothetical statistical offices in different cities—the specification of a fixed metallic 
standard was the only means known to the authors of providing a semblance of price 
level stability.
13  That the “value” specified by Article I, Section 8, was to be adjusted 
very infrequently (if ever) was, it seems clear, implied by the expressions “to coin 
money” and “regulate the value thereof” appearing in the same sentence as that 
pertaining to establishment of standards for weights and measures.  Given today’s 
technology, however, near-constancy of the value of the medium of exchange could be 
provided by governmental specification of a comprehensive price index, rather than the 
                                                 
13 In simpler words, the Constitution’s authors believed that a gold (or silver or bimetallic) standard was the 
most effective device for maintaining the purchasing power of money, thereby preventing inflations or 
deflations that would be unfair to either creditors or debtors and disruptive for the society at large.   9
price of gold, that the monetary authority could keep at a virtually constant level over 
time by standing ready to buy or sell (via a redemption medium such as Treasury bills) 
bundles of goods and services specified by the comprehensive index.  For the U.S., for 
example, Congress could designate a widely-defined price index and assign the Federal 
Reserve the technical task of keeping the associated inflation rate equal to (or at lease 
close to) zero.
14  Indeed, it would be possible for assigned task to be to keep some 
measure of aggregate nominal spending (such as nominal GDP or final demand) growing 
steadily at a non-inflationary rate. This would provide the United States with a clear 
monetary standard, which we do not have at present, and would specify the Fed’s duties 
in such a way that the Fed would have monetary policy independence, which would then 
be used in meeting the standard specified, in accordance with the Constitution, by the 
Congress.  
  Obviously, this type of reasoning could be applied to Japan or other nations with 
market economies.  In addition, an arrangement of the type described would be entirely in 
the spirit of the “New Keynesian” or “New Neoclassical Synthesis” type of monetary 
policy analysis that had represented something of a “consensus” among researchers, as 
described by Goodfriend (2007) and exemplified by Woodford (2003), before the crisis 
of 2007-2009 erupted in a manner that has demoralized and confused economists and 
policymakers in recent years.  This spirit, it might be added, involves viewing the central 
bank’s role as that of the monetary authority, rather than a financial intermediary (i.e., 
                                                 
14 Here I am not taking a position as to whether the system should permit base drift.  In choosing the index 
and setting the target inflation rate, the Congress should of course take advantage of professional expertise 
in such matters, which would (I believe) correctly involve considerable discussion with officials and 
economists of the Federal Reserve System.  It might be argued that the Fed’s role would be to adopt a 
policy rule, for adjustment of a policy instrument (an interest rate or monetary base growth rate), that would 
be intended to achieve price-level stability over a period longer than the intermeeting span.       10
“bank”).  It reflects the sharply different duties of the central bank under metallic and 
paper arrangements, either of which can be designed to support a monetary standard that 
provides price-level stability.          11
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